

CS 245E DEDUCTION RULES FOR PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC – QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE

PR (Premise)

$n.$	ϕ	PR
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R (Re-iteration)

$m.$	ϕ	
$n.$	ϕ	R m

AS (Assumption)

$n.$	ϕ	AS
------	--------	----

\wedge I

$k.$	ϕ	
$l.$	ψ	
$n.$	$(\phi \wedge \psi)$	\wedge I k, l

\wedge E (left)

$m.$	$(\phi \wedge \psi)$	
$n.$	ϕ	\wedge E m

\wedge E (right)

$m.$	$(\phi \wedge \psi)$	
$n.$	ψ	\wedge E m

\forall I (left)

$m.$	ϕ	
$n.$	$(\phi \forall \psi)$	\forall I m

\forall I (right)

$m.$	ψ	
$n.$	$(\phi \forall \psi)$	\forall I m

\forall E

$i.$	$(\phi \vee \psi)$	
$j.$	ϕ	AS
$k.$	θ	
$l.$	ψ	AS
$m.$	θ	
$n.$	θ	\forall E $i, j-k, l-m$

\rightarrow I

$k.$	ϕ	AS
$l.$	ψ	
$n.$	$(\phi \rightarrow \psi)$	\rightarrow I $k-l$

\rightarrow E

$k.$	$(\phi \rightarrow \psi)$	
$l.$	ϕ	
$n.$	ψ	\rightarrow E k, l

\leftrightarrow I

$k.$	$(\phi \rightarrow \psi)$	
$l.$	$(\psi \rightarrow \phi)$	
$n.$	$(\phi \leftrightarrow \psi)$	\leftrightarrow I k, l

\leftrightarrow E (forward)

$m.$	$(\phi \leftrightarrow \psi)$	
$n.$	$(\phi \rightarrow \psi)$	\leftrightarrow E m

\leftrightarrow E (reverse)

$m.$	$(\phi \leftrightarrow \psi)$	
$n.$	$(\psi \rightarrow \phi)$	\leftrightarrow E m

\neg I

$k.$	ϕ	AS
$l.$	\perp	
$n.$	$\neg\phi$	\neg I $k-l$

\neg E

$k.$	ϕ	
$l.$	$\neg\phi$	
$n.$	\perp	\neg E k, l

Reductio Ad Absurdum

$k.$	$\neg\phi$	AS
$l.$	\perp	
$n.$	ϕ	RAA $k-l$

\perp E

$m.$	\perp	
$n.$	ϕ	\perp E m

Review:

Last time, we introduced the Natural Deduction proof system, along with its 15 rules of inference. They're displayed on the previous page.

A **proof** in this system is defined to be a finite sequences of lines of the form:

$$N. \quad \psi \quad \text{Rule } ?, ? \dots ?$$

where N is line #, $\psi \in L^P(\sigma)$, and...

...“Rule” is one of the 15 deduction rules applied to previous lines “?, ?, ..., ?” appearing in the proof.

For $\Gamma \subseteq L^P(\sigma)$ and $\psi \in L^P(\sigma)$, we say $\Gamma \vdash \psi$, “ Γ proves ψ ,”

if there is a formal proof whose last line is ψ , w/ all

“PR” (premise) lines coming from Γ and **no earlier line in the proof contains ψ .** \leftarrow minimality condition

Eg's of formal proofs: (See L.Ole notes!)

You also learned about some common “Derived Rules” of logic, which can be proven from the fundamental rules of ND:

- **Modus Tollens**, aka “denying the consequent”:

$$\{p \rightarrow q, \neg q\} \vdash \neg p$$

- **Law of the Excluded Middle:**

$$\vdash (p \vee \neg p)$$

- **Disjunctive Syllogism:**

$$\{(p \vee q), \neg p\} \vdash q$$

- **DeMorgan's Laws:**

$$\neg(p \vee q) \vdash (\neg p \wedge \neg q) \quad \text{and} \quad \neg(p \wedge q) \vdash (\neg p \vee \neg q)$$

Aside: Some of you may have heard about a notion of “DeMorgan’s Laws” in elementary set theory...

- If $A, B \subseteq X$ for some universe set X , then:

$$(A \cup B)^c = A^c \cap B^c, \quad (A \cap B)^c = A^c \cup B^c,$$

where $A^c = X \setminus A$ is the set complement of A in X .

- More generally, for any family $\{A_i\}_{i \in I}$ of sets $A_i \subseteq X$,

$$\left(\bigcup_{i \in I} A_i \right)^c = \bigcap_{i \in I} A_i^c \quad \text{and} \quad \left(\bigcap_{i \in I} A_i \right)^c = \bigcup_{i \in I} A_i^c.$$

There is a nice interplay between the DeMorgan’s Laws of set theory and the DeMorgan’s Laws of propositional logic; they’re basically the same.

The duality stems from the definition of intersection and union, which involve conjunction and disjunction:

$$A \cup B := \{x \in X : x \in A \vee x \in B\}$$

$$A \cap B := \{x \in X : x \in A \wedge x \in B\}$$

The proof of set theory DeMorgan’s therefore follows directly from these definitions and the DeMorgan’s of logic.

Exercises:

1. Try to prove the 4 Derived Laws above, all by yourself.
2. Prove the (finite, 2-argument) DeMorgan’s laws of set theory using DeMorgan’s laws for logic.

Soundness & Completeness:

We've learned two different notions of logical consequence / "analyzing arguments":

$$\Gamma \models \varphi \quad \text{and} \quad \Gamma \vdash \varphi.$$

semantic \uparrow syntactic \uparrow

It would be nice if these two notions are equivalent to each other; i.e., a set of premises logically implies a conclusion iff there exists a formal proof of the conclusion from the premises.

But we cannot expect this to be true without proving it.

Soundness: Whenever we obtain a proof of φ from Γ , we know that φ must also follow from Γ logically.

Thm.: (Soundness of prop.'l logic)

$$\text{For every } \Gamma \subseteq L^p(\sigma) \text{ and } \varphi \in L^p(\sigma), \\ \Gamma \vdash \varphi \Rightarrow \Gamma \models \varphi.$$



You should always try and find such interpretations when you meet a new theorem. Also ask, "Why do I care? What does this result give us/allow us to do?"

Intuitively:

"Our system of propositional logic + Natural Deduction cannot prove false statements."

The proof of the Soundness theorem uses a couple of basic facts about logical consequence:

Prop. 1:

$$\text{If } \Gamma \models \varphi \text{ then also } \Gamma' \models \varphi, \forall \Gamma' \subseteq L^p(\sigma) \text{ s.t. } \Gamma' \supseteq \Gamma.$$

Prop. 2:

$$\text{Let } \Gamma \subseteq L^p(\sigma) \text{ and } \varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_k \in L^p(\sigma) \text{ such that } \Gamma \models \varphi_1, \dots, \Gamma \models \varphi_k. \\ \text{If } \psi \in L^p(\sigma) \text{ is s.t. } \{\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_k\} \models \psi, \text{ then } \Gamma \models \psi.$$

Prop 3: Semantic forms of all 15 rules of natural deduction.
(Omitted. See notes!)

Completeness: Any time we have a logically valid argument of φ from Γ , we should be able to find a proof of φ from Γ .

Def'n: $\Gamma \subseteq L^p(\sigma)$ is:

- consistent when $\Gamma \not\vdash \perp$
- inconsistent when $\Gamma \vdash \perp$, and
- maximally consistent when Γ is consistent and, for any $\varphi \notin \Gamma$, $\Gamma \cup \{\varphi\}$ is inconsistent.

Using these, we prove a few basic facts needed to prove the Completeness Theorem.

For instance, that consistent sets of formulas are satisfiable.

— (Other results omitted! See notes.) —

Thm.: (Completeness of prop.'l logic):

For every $\Gamma \subseteq L^p(\sigma)$ and $\varphi \in L^p(\sigma)$, $\Gamma \models \varphi \Rightarrow \Gamma \vdash \varphi$.

Intuitively,

"Whenever something is true in proposition logic, there exists a proof for it in ND."

Thus, $\boxed{\Gamma \vdash \varphi \Leftrightarrow \Gamma \models \varphi}$... very satisfying. 😊

~~~~~ End Review. ~~~~~

# Practice Problems:

## ① Formal Proofs:

(a.) Double negation:

$$\{p\} \vdash \neg\neg p$$

$$\{\neg\neg p\} \vdash p$$

Sol.:

|    |              |          |        |
|----|--------------|----------|--------|
| 1. | p            | PR       |        |
| 2. | $\neg p$     | AS       |        |
| 3. | $\perp$      | $\neg E$ | 1, 2   |
| 4. | $\neg\neg p$ | $\neg I$ | 2-3 // |

Sol.:

|    |              |          |                                |
|----|--------------|----------|--------------------------------|
| 1. | $\neg p$     | AS       | $\leftarrow$ Notice the order! |
| 2. | $\neg\neg p$ | PR       |                                |
| 3. | $\perp$      | $\neg E$ | 1, 2                           |
| 4. | p            | RAA      | 1-3 //                         |

(b.) Excluded middle:  $\vdash (p \vee \neg p)$

Sol.:

|    |                       |            |             |
|----|-----------------------|------------|-------------|
| 1. | $\neg(p \vee \neg p)$ | AS         |             |
| 2. | p                     | AS         |             |
| 3. | $(p \vee \neg p)$     | VI (right) | 2           |
| 4. | $\perp$               | $\neg E$   | 3, 1        |
| 5. | $\neg p$              | AS         |             |
| 6. | $(p \vee \neg p)$     | VI (left)  | 5           |
| 7. | $\perp$               | $\negE$    | 6, 1        |
| 8. | $\perp$               | VE         | 1, 2-4, 5-7 |
| 9. | $(p \vee \neg p)$     | RAA        | 1-8 //      |

This line is missing from the proof in Eric Blais' notes!

(c.) De Morgan's II: (Not in the notes):  $\{\neg(p \wedge q)\} \vdash (\neg p \vee \neg q)$

Sol.:

|     |                            |            |      |
|-----|----------------------------|------------|------|
| 1.  | $\neg(p \wedge q)$         | PR         |      |
| 2.  | $\neg(\neg p \vee \neg q)$ | AS         |      |
| 3.  | $\neg p$                   | AS         |      |
| 4.  | $\neg p \vee \neg q$       | VI (right) | 3    |
| 5.  | $\perp$                    | $\negE$    | 4, 2 |
| 6.  | $\neg q$                   | AS         |      |
| 7.  | $\neg p \vee \neg q$       | VI (left)  | 6    |
| 8.  | $\perp$                    | $\negE$    | 7, 2 |
| 9.  | p                          | RAA        | 3-5  |
| 10. | q                          | RAA        | 6-8  |

|     |                        |            |         |
|-----|------------------------|------------|---------|
| 11. | $p \wedge q$           | $\wedge I$ | 9, 10   |
| 12. | $\perp$                | $\neg E$   | 11, 1   |
| 13. | $(\neg p \vee \neg q)$ | RAA        | 2-12 // |

2. Soundness:

Show that there is no Natural Deduction proof to witness

$$\{p \rightarrow q, r \rightarrow q\} \vdash \{p \rightarrow r\}.$$

Sol.: By Soundness Thm,  $\Gamma \vdash \varphi \Rightarrow \Gamma \models \varphi$ .

Taking the contrapositive,  $\Gamma \not\models \varphi \Rightarrow \Gamma \not\vdash \varphi$ .

We will show  $\Gamma \not\models \varphi$  by exhibiting a valuation  $v$ :

$$v^*(\Gamma) = T \text{ but } v^*(\varphi) = F:$$

Let:  $v$ :  $p \mapsto T$   
 $q \mapsto T$   
 $r \mapsto F$  . Then,  $v^*(p \rightarrow q) = T$   
 $v^*(r \rightarrow q) = T,$

but  $v^*(p \rightarrow r) = F$ , so this  $v^*$  shows  $\Gamma \not\models \varphi$ , hence  $\Gamma \not\vdash \varphi$ .

3. Soundness & Completeness: □

Suppose that  $\Sigma \vdash A$  and  $\Sigma \cup \{A\} \vdash B$ , for some set  $\Sigma$  and propositional formulas  $A$  and  $B$ . Is it always the case that  $\Sigma \vdash B$ ? Provide a proof or a counterexample.

Sol.: It is always the case. Proof:

By Soundness,  $\Sigma \vdash A$  and  $\Sigma \cup \{A\} \vdash B$  imply  $\Sigma \models A$  and  $\Sigma \cup \{A\} \models B$ , respectively. Let  $v^*$  be any truth val.'n s.t.

$$v^*(\Sigma) = T. \text{ Since } \Sigma \models A, v^*(A) = T.$$

Hence,  $v^*(\Sigma \cup \{A\}) = T$ . And since  $\Sigma \cup \{A\} \models B$ ,

also  $v^*(B) = T$ . Thus, we've shown that  $\Sigma \models B$ .

By Completeness, this means  $\Sigma \vdash B$ . □

~ Fin. ~